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WORKS MADE FOR HIRE IN INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW
by Richard Colby *
This comment with respect to aspects of authors' rights and the
employment relationship under the United States Copyright Act of
1976 will also consider United States law in relation to different con-
cepts of laws of other nations.
Professor Mario Fabiani of Rome University has written on Latin
legal principles of protection of the rights of salaried authors, stating
that:
The Latin legal concept entails that the right in the work be-
longs in the first place to the author while the Anglo-Saxon
concept of origin relies on afictio juris in the sense of an as-
signment by legal right to the employer (legal assignment) or
else of a legal presumption of assignment (legal presumption).
Professor Fabiani has suggested the "initiation of studies on the
problems relating to the protection of salaried authors."' This article
may, perhaps, advance that study.
INTRODUCTION
The United States concept of copyright has a Constitutional, and
hence a legislative base, somewhat in contrast to the "droit d'auteur,"2
as so firmly expressed in France's Law of March 11, 1957 on Literary
and Artistic Property.3
©1982, 1983 Richard Colby. J.D. 1949 Yale Law School.
I An earlier version of this article was published by the author in the copyright law
journal of the United Nations, Unesco's Copyright Bulletin, Volume XVI, No. 3, 1982, and
is republished with the permission of the author.
The views expressed in this article have been prepared by the author solely in his per-
sonal capacity, and do not necessarily represent the position of any organization with which
the author is associated. Mr. Colby is Chairman for 1982 and 1983 of the American Bar
Association's Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Subcommittee on Employ-
ment for Hire of its Committee on Authors; Senior Distribution & Marketing Counsel of
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation; and former Chairman of the Copyright Commit-
tee of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
1. XV Unesco Copyright Bulletin 20, 21, 24 (1981).
2. Monta, The Concept of "Copyright" Versus the "Droit D'Auteur," 32 S. CAL. L. REV.
177 (1959).
3. XIX Revue Internationale Du Droit D'Auteur 503 (1958).
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Article I of the French Law provides that:
The author of an intellectual work shall, by the mere fact of
its creation, enjoy an exclusive incorporeal property right in
the work, effective against all persons."'
The United States Constitution sets forth the principle that:
The Congress shall have Power. . . To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.5
This the United States Congress has done most recently in the
1976 Copyright Act ("the Act") generally effective January 1, 1978.6 In
some highly significant respects United States law has come much
closer to international concepts, particularly in establishing the term of
copyright, other than for a "work made for hire,"7 as, generally, "con-
sisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death,",
running until "the end of the calendar year in which (the term) would
otherwise expire."9
Following Anglo-Saxon concepts of the common law, as enunci-
ated in the Constitution of the United States, the Act provides that:
Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the author or authors of the work.'0
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the au-
thor for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have ex-
pressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright."
The Preamble to the Statute of Anne of 1710 described the Statute as:
An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, for the Encour-
agement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful
Books, and for Preventing the Reprinting of Books and other
Writings, without the Consent of the Authors or Proprietors
4. Id.
5. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
6. Public Law 94-553, Title 17 of the United States Code.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101, and § 302(c). The copyright of a work made for hire generally
'endures for a term of seventy-five years from the year of its first publication" [distribution],
running until "the end of the calendar year in which (the term) would otherwise expire."
8. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 305.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
II. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
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of such Books and Writings..."
As has been noted by Professors Alan Latman and Robert A. Gorman:
This was the celebrated Statute of Anne (8 Anne c. 19, 1710),
the first statute of all time specifically to recognize the rights
of authors and the foundation of all subsequent legislation on
the subject of copyright both here and abroad.'
3
In the United Kingdom, the employer is also generally considered
the first owner of copyright, 4 with specific consequences set forth in
U.K. Copyright Act, 1956.11
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Before reviewing the American statutory definition of a "work
made for hire," and its effects and implications, we may note the inter-
relationship of an author's rights, for example, under French law and
under Italian law, particularly in relation to a motion picture.,6
As previously noted by the writer,'7 although Article 14 of
France's Law of 1957, and Article 44 of Italy's Copyright Law do not
include the producer/employer (the motion picture production com-
pany) among statutory authors, it is believed that Article 17 of French
Law, and Article 45 of Italian Law, permit the producer to secure the
copyright on the motion picture, thereby protecting the rights of all au-
thors as well as the producer. 8
Article 14 of the French Law describes the co-auteurs of a cine-
matographic work made in collaboration to include:
1. The author of the script.
2. The author of the adaptation.
12. For historical review of copyright law in England, see Copinger and Skone James on
Copyright, Paragraphs 21-45 (12th ed. 1980).
13. Latman and Gorman, Copyright for the Eighties (1981).
14. § 4(4) and § 13. The "maker" of a cinematograph film is "entitled" to any copyright
in the film. The "maker" is "the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the mak-
ing of the film are undertaken."
15. Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 346 (12th ed. 1980); and text at notes 34
and 35 infra.
16. Colby, Copyright Protectionfor Cinematographic Works Under the Universal Copy-
right Convention, XV Unesco Copyright Bulletin 198, 238, 278 (1962).
17. United States Copyright Renewals and French Authors, 33 Revue Internationale Du
Droit D'Auteur 58 (1961); Legal Aspects of Motion Picture Production in Europe, 8 Journal
of The Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 85 (1960).
18. Colby, International Copyright Protection, 44 Revue Internationale Du Droit
D'Auteur 98 (1964); X New York Law Forum 45 (1964); Abridged with a Forward and
Comments by C.J. Bannon of the New South Wales Bar, 37 The Australian Law Journal 20
(1963).
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3. The author of the dialogue.
4. The author of the musical compositions.
5. The director (r'alisateur).
Article 44 of the Italian Law describes the co-authors of a cinemat-
ographic work to include:
1. The author of the subject.
2. The author of the scenario.
3. The composer of the music.
4. The artistic director.
Under Article 17 of the French Law:
17. The "producer" of a cinematographic work is the physi-
cal person or legal entity who takes the initiative and respon-
sibility for the production of work.
The authors of a cinematographic work, except for the author
of the musical compositions, with or without words, shall be
bound to the producer by a contract which, in the absence of
a clause to the contrary, shall constitute the transfer to his
benefit of the exclusive right of cinematographic exploitation,
without prejudice to the rights recognized to the author by the
provisions of Part II, and especially Articles 26 and 35.
Under Article 45 of the Italian Law:
45. Within the limits indicated in (subsequent) Articles, the
exercise of the rights of economic utilization of a cinemato-
graphic work shall belong to the person who has organized
the production of the said work.
The person who is indicated in the cinematographic film as
the producer shall be deemed to be the producer of the cine-
matographic work. If the work is registered according to the
second paragraph of Article 103, the presumption established
by the said Article shall prevail. 9
It is the writer's opinion that, through the bridge of International
Copyright Treaties, such as the Universal Copyright Convention and
the Berne Union, the legal concepts evidenced by the foregoing expres-
sions of le droit d'auteur are, and have been, reconcilable with Ameri-
can legal principles, within the framework of contracts, particularly
through collective bargaining labor agreements.2 °
Many of the concepts advocated in Latin jurisprudence are dealt
19. XIX Revue Internationale Du Droit D'Auteur 505 (1958); 1 Publishing, Entertain-
ment, Advertising and Allied Fields Law Quarterly 283 (1961).
20. See, especially, the 1973, 1977 and 1981 Writers Guild of America Agreements.
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with in United States Copyright Law on the basis of the principles of
equity in order to achieve a fair assessment of the interests concerned.
In many substantive areas of concern to all interested in authors' rights
and copyright, there has developed a remarkable reconciliation be-
tween Latin and Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
That there exist such basic foundations as the Berne Union and
the Universal Copyright Convention encourages reliance on hope for
the future of the amity and the comity of international copyright law.
United States law respects the original creation of the mind. In-
deed, in the spirit of the Constitution, copyright exists "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts." 2'
WORKS MADE FOR HIRE
Under the United States Copyright Act, a "work made for hire"
includes: (a) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment. This provision of the Act, found in Definitions § 101,
follows traditional law and carries forward the principles of the 1909
Act, covering the normal situation applicable to a salaried employee.
Since collective bargaining agreements may apply or become applica-
ble to the employment relationship, it is the writer's opinion that the
Act should not be changed in this area. Most, if not substantially all,
creative employees who prepare copyrightable material are represented
in Guild or Union negotiations and have an opportunity therein (as
well as in the initial employment itself) to establish different or modi-
fied results, and in fact have had occasion to do so.
This principle is embodied in § 201(b) of the Act to the effect that
"the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is con-
sidered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them,
owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright."
As stated in the Congressional Report supporting the Act:
The work-made-for-hire provisions of this bill represent a
carefully balanced compromise. . . well established in Amer-
ican copyright law, and to exchange that for the uncertainties
of the shop right doctrine would not only be of dubious value
to employers and employees alike, but might also reopen a
number of other issues.22
A "work made for hire" also may include: (b) a work specially
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
22. H. Rep. No.94-1476 (1976) at 121.
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ordered or commissionedfor use (in the specific categories listed). If the
parties "expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire," such a specially or-
dered or commissioned work is deemed a "work made for hire," the
copyright to which is owned by the person who specially ordered or
commissioned the work.
As stated by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep-
resentatives, the status of such works "was a major issue" in the devel-
opment of the definition of works made for hire and "represents a
compromise which, in effect, spells out those specific categories of com-
missioned works that can be considered 'works made for hire' under
certain circumstances. '2 3 This represents a delicate statutory balance,
relying on private negotiation between the parties and their
representatives.
The question has been raised from time to time whether the defini-
tion of a "work made for hire" in § 101(1) of the Act is adequate, and
whether there is any difficulty in determining whether there is an em-
ployer-employee relationship.
Keeping in mind that the 1909 United States Copyright Act lacked
definition, merely referring, for example, in § 26 to "works made for
hire," and in § 24 to "an employer for whom such work is made for
hire," consideration should be given to the fact that the 1976 Act has
defined the term as:
a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment . . .24
As stated in the 1961 Copyright Law Revision Report [Blue Book]
of the United States Register of Copyrights:
Instead of the phrase "works made for hire," it was proposed
in previous revision bills to substitute "works created by an
employee within the regular scope of his employment." We
would adopt this more precise language as a definition of
"works made for hire."' 25
Case law has proven adequate, even under the 1909 Act, to reach
reasonable conclusions on the scope of this language, as summarized in
Study 13 of the Copyright Law Revision Studies26 published in 1958,
and, of course, in many law review articles.
23. Id.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
25. U.S. Register of Copyrights, Copyright Law Revision Report 87 (1961).
26. See text at note 33 infra.
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The Register's 1965 Supplementary Report [Yellow Book] re-
minds us that:
The definition now in section 101 represents a carefully
worked out compromise aimed at balancing legitimate inter-
ests on both sides.27
Also, Epoch Producing Corp. v. Kil/iam Shows, Inc. ,2" noted that:
The right of the employer to direct and supervise the manner
in which the work is performed has been deemed the "crucial
question" and the "hallmark of 'an employment for hire' rela-
tionship." Consequently, when an alleged employer does not
have the right to direct, control, or supervise the work of an
author, there exists no employment relationship. Several fac-
tors to be considered in this regard include whether the au-
thor's work was edited by his employer and whether there was
any control over the style and content of the work.
Finally, the fact that the work was created at the instance,
expense, time and facilities of the employer has been consid-
ered as pertinent factors in establishing an employment
relationship.29
The Congress of the United States has elected to define the term in
a way thought to permit the Courts to accommodate cor .peting inter-
ests, more importantly, "securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."
Section 201(b) of the Act is referred to as "... one of the basic
principles of the present law."30
This principle of law has particular application to the exclusionary
provisions of § 203 and § 304(c) of the Act, dealing with the new statu-
tory concept relating to termination of transfers under certain circum-
stances. Both § 203 and § 304(c) expressly exclude from their
application any work made for hire. As stated in H. Rep. 94-1476:
The right of termination would not apply to "works made for
hire," which is one of the principal reasons the definition of
that term assumed importance in the development of the
27. U.S. Register of Copyrights, Copyright Law Revision, Supplementary Report, Part
6, at 66 (1965).
28. 522 F.2d 737 (1975).
29. Id. at 744, as quoted in Angel and Tannenbaum, Works Madefor Hire Under S.22,
22 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 209, 223 (1976).
30. H. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976) at 121.
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TERMINATION OF TRANSFERS AND LICENSES UNDER § 203 AND
§ 304(c) OF THE ACT
These Sections reflect a careful statutory balance, resulting from
Congressional consultation with all interested parties who had been
sought out, consulted and heard from during the development, drafting
and adoption of the Act.
The right under § 304(c) to terminate pre-Act transfers with re-
spect to the nineteen-year extension of the duration of the copyright
renewal term, subject to the right to continue to utilize derivative works
previously made under authority of the grant, would seem to be a fair
balance of interests as between the public interest, authors and users.
The right under § 203 to terminate post-Act transfers may be exer-
cised during the period of five years beginning thirty-five years after the
grant of rights, subject to the right to continue to utilize derivative works
previously made under authority of the grant. The thirty-five-year pe-
riod would, again, seem to represent a reasonable period, and was the
result of long and studious consideration during the legislative process.
The notice concept-termination is not automatic-and the
mechanics of such notice requirements, together with the applicable
regulations, seem to be appropriate.
Works madefor hire are not subject to the termination of rightspro-
visions of the Act. Indeed, as noted above, this was "one of the princival
reasons the definition of that term assumed importance in the development
of the bill."32
BACKGROUND
As stated in one of the classic Studies made by the U.S. Copyright
Office preparatory to revision of the 1909 Act:
A subsidiary question is raised if copyright is to be vested ini-
tially in the employer. Should he be designated somewhat ar-
tificially as the "author" or merely as the first owner of
copyright? Prior revision bills have differed on this point, as
do foreign laws. The choice of designation should be made
with appreciation of the consequences, noted earlier, which
may be incident to the status of authorship, regardless of
questions of copyright ownership. For example, whether the
31. Id. at 125.
32. Id.
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employer or employee is deemed to be the author may deter-
mine the eligibility of a work for protection where its eligibil-
ity depends upon the nationality of the author, or may
determine the duration of copyright under a system where the
term is based on the life of the author.33
As indicated in the previous section of this paper dealing with stat-
utory termination of transfers and licenses, the Congress acted purpose-
fully in continuing the traditional rule in the United States that the
employer is "considered the author," with full regard to the related
consequences affecting termination rights, duration and nationality of
the work.
Although the Anglo-Saxon concept, and more particularly the
American rule, is sometimes referred to as a "fictio juris" or as "artifi-
cial" or as a "fiction," inquiry into the purposes and results of this legal
structure is crucial to analysis of the subject of this study.
In the major underlying Report of the United States Copyright
Office to the Congress, the Register of Copyrights, pointing out that
this legal structure is the simple and convenient mechanism to achieve
legislative decisions, said in 1965 that:
In the course of drafting, however, it became clear that there
are great advantages of convenience and simplicity in assimi-
lating employers to "authors" for all purposes. It was also
pointed out that failure to identify the employer as "author"
might have unintended consequences as, for example, with re-
spect to the protection of motion pictures in foreign countries.
Thus, since the advantages of making the employer an "author"
for purposes of the statute outweigh any conceptual doiculties
involved in doing so, subsection (b) of section 201 provides
that, "[i]n the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered
the author for purposes of this title. . . .
Melville B. Nimmer, Professor of Law at the University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles, has pointed out that:
Under Section 201(b) of the current Act the parties may agree
that the employee rather than the employer "owns all rights
comprised in the copyright," but the proviso that "the em-
ployer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
33. Study No. 13, Borge Varmer, Works Made For Hire And On Commission (1958),
reprinted in 1 Studies on Copyright, Arthur Fisher Memorial Ed. 717, 732 (1963).
34. Copyright Law Revision, Part 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copy-
rights [Yellow Book] at 66.
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considered the author for purposes of this title" is not subject
to variation by agreement between the parties. Is it unconsti-
tutional to thus confer authorship status upon the employer
"regardless of circumstances?" Probably not, since the em-.
ployer is not thereby favored over the employee regardless of
the intent of the parties. They may agree that the "rights
comprised in the copyright" are effectively owned by the em-
ployee. The other legal consequences of authorship status,
which are not subject to contrary agreement by the parties, do
notfavor the employer over the employee. They go rather to the
copyrightability of the work, and to the term ofprotection. The
same results could have been achieved even if the employee
rather than the employer were deemed the "author." The
fiction of the employer as author was employed for these pur-
poses not in order to achieve substantive results that could not
have been otherwise achieved, but rather because of the "con-
venience and simplicity" of this manner of achieving such re-
sults (italics added)."
Indeed, the same sophisticated analysis appears in the other stat-
utes referred to in this paper-in France, in Italy and in the United
Kingdom. The question is: what are the consequences, and how are the
rights and obligations of the auteur balanced?
THE U.K. REDWOOD CASE
Of particular interest in international copyright law, in relation to
works made for hire, including certain types of commissioned works, is
the 1980 decision in the Redwood case in the House of Lords.36
At issue were questions as to the application of the reversionary
provisions of Section 5(2) of U.K. Copyright Act, 1911 ("the 1911
Act"), as and to the extent continued in force by U.K. Copyright Act,
1956 ("the 1956 Act"). Under the Acts of 1911 and 1956, certain as-
signments of copyright and grants of interests therein made by an au-
thor between July 1, 1912 and June 1, 1957, automatically revert to the
35. Nimmer on Copyright, § 1.06[C], at page 1-41 (1981).
36. Chappel & Co. Ltd. v. Redwood Music Ltd., and Redwood Music Ltd. v. Francis
Day and Hunter Ltd. 2 All E.R. 817 (1980). In the courts below, see Redwood Music Ltd. v.
B. Feldman & Co. Ltd. in the Court of Appeal (1979) RPC 385; and, in the Queen's Bench
Division of the High Court of Justice, Redwood Music Ltd. v. Francis Day and Hunter Ltd.
(1978) RPC 429; Redwood Music Ltd. v. B. Feldman & Co. Ltd. (1979) RPC 1; Redwood
Music Ltd. v. Chappel & Co. Ltd. (1980) RPC 337; and Redwood Music Ltd. v. Chappel &
Co. Ltd. (1982) RPC 109.
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author's "legal representatives as part of his estate" twenty-five years
after the death of the author.37
There are three specific exceptions to the operation of this rever-
sion clause.
Excluded are:
(A) Collective works, if separately copyrightable, or a li-
cense to publish a work or part of a work as part of a
collective work; and
(B) Certain works specially ordered or commissioned, such
as photographs and portraits; and
(C) Works made by a person under a contract of service
where the work was made in the course of such
employment.38
Redwood decided that a musical work was not a collective work
within the meaning of the foregoing exception, even if the lyrics were
written by one person and the music was composed by another person;
therefore the reversion clause applied to the musical works before the
Court.
The House of Lords also held that a particular United States con-
tract, under which a deceased author's statutory successors granted
U.S. renewal rights to a publisher, was too narrowly drawn to include,
in the words of Section 5(2), "the reversionary interest in the copyrights
expectant," the twenty-five year balance of the U.K. copyright term,
which reverted to the author's legal representatives.39
One of the Lords Justice, Lord Keith of Kinkel, noted that, while
preferring to reserve his opinion for another day, some collective works
might "engender" a separate copyright, "distinct from the copyrights in
the individual parts" of the collective work, and would, therefore, come
within the exception and not revert. Lord Keith referred to examples
such as a "literary text and illustrations closely intermingled . . . or a
complicated work comprising musical and literary components such as
an opera."'  Although potentially involving additional issues, we may
37. Section 5(2) of the 1911 Act, quoted in Redwood and reprinted in the Appendix to
Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (12th ed. 1980); the transitional provisions of the
1956 Act, in relation to Section 5(2) of the 1911 Act are discussed in Redwood, especially
(1979) RPC 1, and at Paragraph 419 of Copinger and Skone James on Copyright.
38. Section 5(1) of the 1911 Act; Paragraph 420 of the Copinger and Skone James on
Copyright, supra note 37 above; Rosen and Silber, Reversion Under British Copyright Law, I
Journal of Copyright, Entertainment and Sports Law of the Tennessee Bar Association 67,
68 (1982).
39. 2 All E.R. 817, 822, 827-28.
40. 2 All E.R. 817, 831.
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speculate that a motion picture may be such a "complicated work," not
subject to reversion.
The Redwood case resulted in a settlement agreement establishing
certain mechanisms for its practical application to thousands of musical
works that may come within the rule of that case.
As is generally known in the music industry, the settlement in-
cludes a provision that United States works which, under the United
States Copyright Act, would be deemed to be works made for hire, will
be deemed to be contract of employment works for the purposes of the
exception in Section 5(l)(b) of the 1911 Act,4 ' and will not revert.
THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT
The attention of the Bar is called to the invaluable research help
now to be found in The Kaminstein Legislative History Project. A Com-
pendium andAnalytical Index of Materials Leading to the CopyrightAct
of 1976, the first four volumes of which [five or six volumes are pro-
jected] are now available through The Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
and New York University School of Law.42
DIRECTIONS FOR THE EIGHTIES
In the United Kingdom, copyright revision is again under serious
consideration. The 1977 Whitford Committee Report43 has, in 1981,
now resulted in the Government's Green Paper," a sixty-one-page Re-
port of considerations and recommendations for change in U.K. Copy-
right Act, 1956.
The U.K. Government has asked for a wide public comment, stat-
ing at page one of the Green Paper that the "purpose of this document
is to invite public comment on proposals made for the revision of the
law relating to copyright, industrial designs and performers'
41. On the application of U.K. law or U.S. law, see Redwood Music Ltd. v. Francis Day
and Hunter Ltd. (1978) RPC 429, per Goff, J. citing Campbell Connelly and Co. v. Noble
(1963) 1 All E.R. 237, discussed in Colby, International Copyright Protection, 44 RIDA 98 at
129-3 1, and X New York Law Forum 45, 53-4 (1964). Campbell Connelly is quoted at length
in 10 Journal of The Copyright Society of the U.S.A., item 96 at 121-24 (1962).
42. The Research materials that are so carefully the subject of this Compendium and
Analytical Index are to be found in major libraries, and in the private collections of the
Consultants who dedicated so many years to the development of the 1976 Act.
43. Report on Copyright and Designs Law (Cmnd. 6732).
44. Reform of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers' Protection, A
Consultative Document (Cmnd. 8302). Reprinted in 28 Journal of The Copyright Society of
the U.S.A. 569-629 (1981).
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protection."45
Indications at present are that interested parties and their repre-
sentatives have accepted this suggestion of the U.K. Government, and
the debate rages, calmly of course.
In the United States, particular issues excite interest in some areas,
receiving careful and reflective consideration by the Congress.46 Con-
tributing resources to the debate are the legislative history of the 1976
Act, reminding many of the thorough evaluation of alternatives devel-
oped during the more than twenty-year study that led to the United
States Copyright Act of 1976.47
The legislative compromises embodied in the United States Copy-
right Act, as supplemented by collective bargaining agreements and
other agreements with such representative organizations as performing
rights societies, continue an American tradition of law, under the
United States Constitution.
Emerging developments-reflecting a sense of adherence to rea-
sonable solutions reached as recently as 1976, together with judicial
elaboration of Congressional intent in differing fact situations--en-
courage one to believe in harmonization of the laws of many countries,
without loss of traditional principles of law in the United States and in
the United Kingdom.
45. Id. at i.
46. For example, see the Transcript of the Hearings on October 1, 1982, in Washington,
D.C., before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, at which the writer
was privileged to testify, 72-104, and to submit a twenty-six page Written Statement, on S.
2044, 97th Congress, 2d Session, a Bill to amend the Copyright Act regarding works made
for hire.
47. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. Colby, Music in Motion Pictures, 30 Jour-
nal of The Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 34 (1982).
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